DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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MROC DECISION MEMORANDUM 06-2004

SUBJ: 4 NOVEMBER 2003 MARINE REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (MROC) MEETING: MPF(F) AOA IN-PROGRESS REVIEW #3 AND REALIGNING MARINES TO CORE COMBAT CAPABILITIES

Encl: (1) Realigning Marines to Core Combat Capabilities Executive Summary of 4 November 2003

1. The MROC convened at 0945 on 4 November 2003. Attendees were:

Members	Organization
Gen Nyland	ACMC
LtGen Magnus	P&R
LtGen Hough	AVN
LtGen Kelly	I&L
LtGen Huly	PP&O
BGen Ghormley	M&RA
Col Conant	P&R
Also in Attendance	
Mr. Murphy	CL
Mr. Polzin	MCSC
Dr. McGrady	CNA

2. Agenda. The MROC received the third in a series of Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in-progress reviews (IPR) and a decision brief on the Competitive Sourcing Working Group's (CSWG) recommendations for realigning Marines to core combat capabilities.

3. Presentation Executive Summary. Enclosure (1) is the presentation executive summary for the Realigning Marines to Core Combat Capabilities brief. The slide presentations for both briefs are available at the MROC Homepage located at https://hqipoml.hqmc.usmc.mil/portal/servlet/GlobalLogin, or can be obtained from the MROC Secretariat.

4. MPF(F) AoA IPR #3. Mr. Robert Souders, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) MPF(F) AoA Study Director, presented the brief.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the brief was to update the MROC on MPF(F) AoA progress.

b. Presentation Summary.

(1) The presentation was organized into two general areas: "Review of Actions Completed" and "Continuing Analysis." "Review of Actions Completed" covered ship design space for the second iteration of designs, habitability standards, and force closure/employment assumptions and results. The "Continuing Analysis" portion covered Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) basing options, candidate organic surface craft, sustainment implications, survivability assumptions, and the impact of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Seabasing Final Report.

(2) Mr. Souders clarified the following points during the presentation:

(a) The current MPF(F) procurement strategy calls for delivery of the first MPF(F) ship in FY12 and the first 6-9 ship squadron in FY15.

(b) MPF(F) ship designs do not include wet or dry wells. Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) would be craned over the side of an MPF(F) ship and driven to external ship landing platforms.

(c) MPF(F) AoA results will be presented to the Navy and Marine Corps in January 2004 and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in February 2004.

c. Recommendation. None. The IPR was presented for informational purposes.

d. MROC Discussion. The MROC noted the following points during their discussion:

(1) Ship designs must facilitate the efficient movement of cargo, materiel handling equipment (MHE), and personnel from within the ship to aircraft on the flight deck.

(2) The MPF(F) AoA results will assist in refining the Ship-to-Objective Movement (STOM) Concept of Operations (e.g., force closure timelines).

(3) MEB aviation basing remains a significant issue. The MROC discussed the limitations and implications of various basing options, extending the discussion beyond those issues specifically related to MPF(F). The MROC pointed out that JSF and MV-22 basing on LHD-class ships also remains problematic due to their larger aircraft footprints and the associated ship's weight and moment issues. The MROC agreed that MPF(F) aviation basing/support decisions must take into account "Grey Hull" aviation basing/support capabilities (and vice versa). MPF(F) MEB capability requirements, the composition of the MPF(F) MEB,

and the MPF(F) concept of operations will determine the required aircraft mix and must drive the ship's design selection process.

(4) MPF(F) Squadron strategic sustainment requires further study. The current MPSRONs carry 30 days of organic ground supplies and Aviation organizational level support. The MPF(F) Capabilities Matrix identifies the capability for up to 20 days of organic ground supplies and aviation organizational level support sustained by continuous resupply. The MROC agreed that further study is required to determine if 20 days of organic sustainment supplies are adequate based on Naval replenishment capabilities.

e. MROC Decisions. No decisions were rendered. The MROC stressed the importance of remaining engaged in the MPF(F) AoA Study process in preparation for discussions with the Navy to resolve the remaining issues as the AoA concludes.

5. Realigning Marines to Core Combat Capabilities. Mr. David Clifton of I&L presented the brief.

a. Purpose. To obtain MROC approval of a course of action to increase the number of Marines in core combat capabilities; a plan to study further realignments; and the resources needed to carry out the selected course of action.

b. Recommendations.

(1) That the MROC approve:

(a) COA #2, which entails the realignment of approximately one battalion's-worth of Marines.

(b) The additional realignment of approximately 334 Administrative Clerk billets (MOS 0151) identified in COA 3.

(c) The analysis of additional opportunities for competition/realignment.

(d) The recommended core/non-core process designations.

(e) The proposed implementation strategy:

1. Improve service acquisition skills.

2. Centralize implementation.

3. Phase execution.

4. Audit performance and costs.

(2) That the MROC direct:

(a) DC, I&L coordinate COA #2 implementation; coordinate CSWG review of additional opportunities for competition/realignment; and submit a POM06 initiative for required implementation resources.

(b) DC, M&RA and DC, CD respond to OSD on realignments by November 2003 and assess the potential for additional competition/ realignment opportunities.

(c) DC, P&R provide FY04/05 implementation resources.

c. MROC Discussion.

(1) Mr. Clifton clarified the following points during the presentation:

(a) The CSWG's guiding principle was to identify the maximum potential to realign Marines to the Operating Forces without compromising structure or supporting services, rather than to comply with the Management Initiative Decision-907 (MID-907) requirement to compete 3,000 Full-time Equivalents (FTE) or to achieve cost savings.

(b) The CSWG's core/non-core designation recommendations are based on the preponderance of the competencies in each process and recommendations from the program sponsors. Processes may include sub-processes with other core/non-core designations. Additional review will be required to determine which aspects of each process are suitable for competition/realignment.

(c) All three courses of action would fulfill the MID-907 competition requirement.

(2) The MROC emphasized that the goal is to realign Marines to the Operating Forces vice achieve cost savings.

(3) The MROC discussed the perception that outsourcing frequently results in lower quality or less responsive services. Mr. Clifton stated that there is data to indicate that performance tends to dip during the transition to contracted services. After the transition is completed however, contractors have generally met their contractual requirements. The quality of contracted support is predicated primarily on how well the contract articulates the requirement, rather than a case of the contractor or Most Efficient Organization (MEO) under-performing. DC, I&L will continue efforts to improve service contracting skills and investigate additional training opportunities. Additionally, the proposed implementation strategy would establish a system to collect and analyze performance data.

d. MROC Decisions.

(1) The MROC agreed to recommend that the Commandant approve COA 2 and the other recommendations contained in paragraph 5.b.

(2) DC, I&L will prepare an abbreviated slide presentation and position paper for presentation to the Commandant at the earliest opportunity.

W. L. NYLAND

MROC Executive Summary

Mr. Dave Clifton

4 November 2003

Realigning Marines to Core Combat Capabilities

Purpose

To seek MROC approval of: (1) a course of action to increase the number of Marines in core combat capabilities; (2) a plan to study further realignments; and (3) the resources needed to carry out the selected course of action.

Background Information

SecDef and SecNav have emphasized the need to concentrate resources in core combat capabilities and to reengineer, divest or compete non-core capabilities.

On 18 Apr 03, the ACMC directed creation of a Competitive Sourcing Working Group (CSWG) to study the Marine Corps manpower mix.

On 29 Jul 03, USD (P&R) further emphasized the need for manpower mix analysis by asking each service to answer questions about converting military skills to civilian. DCMR&A is scheduled to respond to the Defense Human Resources Board in Mid-November

As a result of MID-907 the Marine Corps is assigned a goal to compete 3,000 non-core billets between FY 05-08.

The Problem

To devise a course of action that will realign more Marines into core combat capabilities and that will:

- Preserve necessary manpower management objectives,
- Accommodate inherently governmental functions,
- Not jeopardize MC end-strength,
- Meet MID 907 targets, and
- Be cost acceptable.

A Solution

Using core and non-core process analysis along with competitive sourcing analysis tools, the CSWG examined work processes in the supporting establishment and elsewhere to determined candidates for realignment through competitive sourcing or reengineering and calculated any associated costs. This analysis also resulted in the identification of candidates for competition to meet the MID 907 targets.

Implementation

The CSWG identified three possible courses of action. All options require up front O&M investment beginning in FY 04 to implement the reengineering/competition tools. FY04/05 funding is available. Funding for personnel transition associated with competitive sourcing will be a POM 06 initiative. Sustained savings exceed costs in the POM for COA 1. Sustained savings and costs in the POM are essentially equal for COA 2. Sustained costs exceed sustained savings in the POM for COA 3.

- **COA 1: Minimum Realignment.**
  - Pro: Realigns a company of Marines.
  - Pro: Meets MID 907 competition goal.
  - Pro: Incurs no sustained O&M costs.
  - Pro: Disrupts military manpower least.
  - Con: Realigns the fewest Marines.
- **COA 2: Affordable Realignment.**
  - Pro: Realigns a battalion of Marines.
  - Pro: Exceeds MID-907 competition goal.
  - Pro: Incurs no sustained O&M costs.
  - Pro: Standardizes support levels across USMC.
  - Con: Does not maximize realignment.
  - Con: Requires complex fund management.
  - Con: Increases impact on selected MOS pyramids.
- **COA 3: Maximum Realignment.**
  - Pro: Realigns a regiment of Marines.
  - Pro: Exceeds MID 907 competition goal.
  - Pro: Standardizes support levels across USMC.
  - Con: Requires complex fund management.
  - Con: Incurs sustained O&M cost.
  - Con: Creates complex implementation for manpower managers.

Recommendation

Approve COA 2 and its implementation approach; Direct further examination of COA 3 for additional future opportunities; Direct that resources required for implementation of COA 2 be made available.